The Influence of Air Power Upon History by Boyne Walter J

Author:Boyne, Walter J [Boyne, Walter J]
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 1589800346
Amazon: B00DN5VG2U
Publisher: Leo Cooper Ltd
Published: 2005-02-02T00:00:00+00:00

Air Power in the Mediterranean Campaigns

Ironically, as the homeland of the most famous of air-power philosophers, Italy had within its power the ability to use air power to influence history immediately upon its entrance into the war. Had the Italians applied all of their efforts to the capture of Malta in June 1940, rather than engaging in the humiliating struggles with a moribund France, it might have altered the conduct of all of the subsequent Mediterranean campaigns. With strong units of the Regia Aeronautica and the Luftwaffe based in Malta, the Mediterranean would in truth have become what Mussolini referred to as “Mare Nostrum”—our sea. This would have destabilized the British position in Africa and probably have convinced Spain to enter the war. It would have precluded the intervention of the British in Greece, and that being so, Germany would not have been compelled to undertake the Balkan campaign that delayed the invasion of the Soviet Union by several critical weeks. But Italy did not have the foresight—or the appetite—to take Malta in 1940, or later in 1941 and 1942 when it might still have been possible.

Instead of becoming a pivotal point in the war, the Mediterranean campaigns, despite their cost in blood and equipment, were mere footnotes to the overall conduct of the war. To put the matter in the perspective with which Hitler regarded it, the Germans were engaging approximately eight enemy divisions in North Africa at a time when they were engaging some 360 enemy divisions in the Soviet Union. There was no comparison in the critical importance of the two theaters.

The campaigns in North Africa came about as a series of whims and preferences on the part of national leaders. It was a whim of Mussolini to extend his African empire. He tried to do so by attacking with vastly superior numbers a small but tough British force. To his dismay, the British promptly defeated his Italian legions. It was a whim of Hitler not to see his Axis partner embarrassed, so that he dispatched the Afrika Korps with just enough resources to redress the situation temporarily, but not enough to gain a decisive victory. It was Winston Churchill’s preference to fight the Germans anywhere but on the continent of Europe, for he dreaded the repetition of the horrors of World War I. He gladly reinforced the theater, for it was the only place that the British could engage the Nazi and Italian forces on anything like equal terms. It was Franklin D. Roosevelt’s preference that American troops get into battle against the Germans as soon as possible, and North Africa was the most logical place to begin.

The four-year-long North African campaigns did not change the outcome of the war, and in fact may have prolonged it. The United States did learn invasion techniques from it, and American troops were blooded, but given the resources poured into it and into the subsequent invasions of Sicily and Italy, it was probably a net loss to the Allies overall.

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